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3.1 Introduction
In my first two articles,1 I have illustrated the pioneering work of Hermann
Dooyeweerd and Fernando Canale as they analyzed the realm and operation
of human rational activities. An understanding of Dooyeweerd's analysis of
theoretical thought and Canale's phenomenological investigation into human
Reason sets a starting point for a much-needed critical investigation into the
field of academic methodologies in general and the multifarious exegetical
methods as they are applied in the field of today's biblical studies in specific.2
In order to gain better insight in the structural understanding of theoretical
thought/Reason, the third article of this series will examine Dooyeweerd's
and Canale's work from a different angle: on one side, I will show how their
frameworks have been used as an analytic tool to critically inquire into theory
building and data interpretation; on the other, I will describe the differences of
their focus and analysis. Both the focus on the use-oriented benefit and the
focus on comparing Dooyeweerd's and Canale's philosophical thinking will set
the stage for a meaningful critique of their work. Such a critique will be part of
my fourth and final article where I try to enhance and unify both works into a
meaningful format, in which this format will not only function as an expedient
framework for an in-depth criticism of biblical methodologies, but also as a
grid for the development of a biblical methodology that does justice to both
the complexity of the biblical data and the biblical hermeneutical horizon.
3.2 Application of the Analysis of Theoretical
Thought/Reason
3.2.1 Dooyeweerd
Using his critique of theoretical thought, Dooyeweerd extensively analyzed
various philosophical traditions and scientific trends, but did not spell out in
1
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detail how it can be used as a methodology for critical analysis in detail. In
his article, "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der
faculteiten" (the relation between philosophy and theology and the controversy
between the departments) we can gain an idea of how Dooyeweerd himself applied
his structural analysis in his critique of theology. As theology is also a
discipline of theoretical thought, its place in Dooyeweerd's article can be
exchanged for any other science. Here his article will serve as a starting
point for revealing the methodological steps such a transcendental critique
demands.
In his article, Dooyeweerd shows that theology is characterized by the
attitude of theoretical thinking like any other science.3 Thus one implication is
that theology must choose an Archimedean standpoint4 just as any other
science must do. Therefore, the content of its Archimedean standpoint is not of
a theological, i.e., theoretical character, but a religious character.5 A second
implication is that theology reflects one of the many Gegenstand-relations: the
opposition of the logical modal aspect and the modal aspect of faith. 6 In
Dooyeweerd's structural analysis of theoretical thought, theology cannot be
understood as a means to come to true knowledge of God and the self as
traditionally believed. Such knowledge is of a supratheoretical character and
can only be obtained by reading the Holy Scriptures with the involvement of the
human heart, which is of supratemporal character. This reading process is further in
need of the guidance of the Holy Spirit.7 Therefore, theology as bound to man's
temporal theoretical thinking cannot claim infallibility or superiority over any
other science. Between the central biblical starting point and the scientific
discipline of theology as dogmatic theology, a necessary philosophical expression of
a starting point that functions as a foundation is to be found, guaranteeing a
theoretical, total view for all the possible Gegenstand-relations that man can involve
himself in with his attitude of theoretical thinking.
From this Archimedean standpoint, it is possible to formulate an idea of
the totality of meaning by which philosophical thought receives an insight into
the totality of the modal diversity of coherence. This insight gives all the
special sciences, among which is theology, their proper place and sphere. Thus
to be able to do biblical theology, we are in need of a biblical philosophy
3
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that is fully dependent on the biblical ground-motive the self identifies
with.8 Giving insight into the modal diversity is the object of philosophical
thinking, not of any specific science, which is unable to look beyond its own
sphere. Since good science can only be done when the total temporal horizon
and its inner relation is laid bare, without philosophy the performance of
nonreductionistic relative science is impossible, as all sciences are in danger of
finding their transcendental idea within its Gegenstand-relation.
According to Dooyeweerd, philosophy is thus not a "vakwetenschap"
(i.e., specific scientific discipline), which searches its object of study within a
certain aspect, but "Zij is veeleer de wetenschap der wetenschappelijke
principia" (She [philosophy] is rather the science of the principles of
science) .9
Continuing in this line of thought, a methodological analysis of thought
should investigate the following specific levels of content:
1. the level of the religious starting point that contains the three
transcendental ideas of coherence, unity, and origin;
2. the level of the expression of the philosophical total view of reality;
3. the level of a specific science characterized by its Gegenstand-relation. In
a critical analysis of thought, one can structure different expressions
according to these three levels, while still being aware that thought constructions
can be complex and not always reducible to these categories.
Total-view thoughts enable the transcendental analysis to uncover the
content of the transcendental ideas because total-view thoughts determine
the understanding of the structural datum. To be able to uncover the totalview perspective, the transcendental idea of origin needs to be found. As
the first and second ways of Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique have
shown, theoretical thinking, including theoretical synthesis, must assume a
transcendental idea of origin. Since, I believe, the discovery of the radical
dependence of philosophy on an idea of origin is most fruitful and will
also give access to the idea of coherence and unity in the critical analysis of
theoretical concepts, I will focus on the idea of origin. Along with Roy A.
Clouser, a philosopher in the Dooyeweerdian tradition, I understand the idea of
origin as a primary belief and as a tool for methodological analysis. Clouser detects
a noetic and an antic sense of primary beliefs as the starting point of theoretical
thinking. The noetic sense concerns the order of beliefs. A belief is primary when
it functions as a necessary presupposition of another belief and does not
itself presuppose yet another belief.10 The ontic sense concerns the
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order of reality: “In this sense one belief is primary with respect to another
when the object of the secondary belief is taken to depend on the object of
the primary belief for its reality?”11
The two senses of primacy (noetic and ontic) show that the idea of
origin functions as an argumentative axiom and as generating a concept of
reality. Noetic and ontic primacies are respectively responsible for the order of
arguments and the order of the being-diversity.
The source of the multitude of different theoretical understandings is
found in the different primary beliefs. A transcendental critique must therefore
search for that which is supposed to exist independently from everything else,
having “unconditional independent reality.”12
There are two types of hypotheses occurring in science and philosophy that can
help to uncover implicit primary beliefs. One is the “entity-hypothesis,” an
intellectual guess that postulates the existence of an underlying hidden reality
that fills in the missing links in the observational data and that helps to make
sense of the data.13 Most helpful, however, is the “perspective-hypothesis,” a
proposed perspective on the arrangement of all structural data.14 Hypotheses
are helpful because they are our own inventions and therefore inspired by the
understanding of ourselves in our sharing in a specific idea of origin, that
functions as primary unconditional independent reality
The hermeneutical questions of a critique of theoretical thought should
therefore be What kind of relations can be found in the presentation of the
structural data? and How do properties of one kind produce properties of
another kind in this theory? By means of these questions, thinkers have made socalled priority assignments that reveal the idea of origin a thinker has
chosen.
3.2.2 Canale's Application of the
Structural Analysis of Reason
In Canale’s view, the diversity of interpretations of a certain subject matter
does not necessarily result from faulty reasoning or evidence. The structure of
Reason makes us understand that the differently chosen dimensionalities of
Reason partly determine the specific interpretational result. Thus truly
understanding and overcoming disagreement requires an analysis and
evaluation of the deeper presuppositions behind interpretations.
On the basis of his formal structure of Reason and the resulting
description of the hypotheticity of Reason, Canale wrote various articles on
11
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the methodological application of his structural analysis. Here I will give a
short description of his suggested procedure to analyze interpretations.
3.2.2.1 The Subject-Object Relation
As Point of Departure
The subject-object relation, as the most foundational structure of Reason,
functions as the point of departure for the analysis of different interpretations.15
Human understanding moves from the interpreting subject to the issue or
thing that is interpreted. The human act of interpretation therefore has a
beginning, a movement, and an end. The beginning is represented by the
subject and its chosen interpretational perspective (presuppositions); the end is
represented by the issue (contained or expressed by the object) or object.16
Consequently, the movement is the process by which the subject interprets
the issue or object.
3.2.2.2 Method
Canale understands the subject-object relation as a methodological one.17 All
knowledge, structured by the subject-object relationship, is thus the result of
method as action. Method as action implies that method has the basic
structure of action involving cause and condition. Action cannot take place
without being caused or without certain conditions. 18 The "cause" of the
hermeneutical method is found in the subject. The subject's causation is
however not autonomous but dependent on and conditioned by the object.
Canale detects three aspects that condition any method-action: the material,
the final, and the formal. The material aspect represents the data that are to be
researched to understand a certain subject matter. The material aspect is the
material object under study; it is the object's condition of the method-action.
The final aspect represents the specific subject matter that the subject tries to
understand. Different subject matters can be approached with the study of a
single object.19 The formal aspect deals with the hermeneutical patterns that are
15
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used in order to process the material or data. The formal side is the subject
side's condition of the method-action.
The variety of methods (ways) stems from the aspects of methodological
conditioning (material, final, and formal). For the sake of clarity, Canale
distinguishes two categories of variety: structural variety and hermeneutical
variety. The structural variety of methods is needed in order to do justice to
the diversity of objects (material aspect) and subject matters (final aspect).
The hermeneutical variety of methods points to the formal aspect of any
act-condition. The formal aspect as the hypothetical character of Reason's
structure lies fully on the subjective side as the subject's contribution to the subjectobject relation. The hermeneutical variety originates from the different
interpretations of hermeneutical principles. One could say that the formal
aspect does not specifically belong to the essence of a scientific discipline, but to
the very essence of human thinking.
Consequently, the formal aspect of act-condition does not only include
the interpretation of Reason's frameworks, but also the understanding
of the ground of Being as a dimensionality of Reason. Canale calls this
foundational ontological level "system," the broadest and all-encompassing
concept, which is synonymous with the "ground of Being." The system is the
ultimate horizon and ground for the development of any paradigm. Canale,
Küng, and others understand "paradigm" to be the interpretation of Reason's
frameworks. There are thus two important theoretical distinctions, referring to
two presuppositional levels, to be made in the formal aspect: the formal level
of system and the formal level of paradigm.20
On the level of the system, i.e. foundational ontology, there is the formal
condition of Reason, i.e., "systematism," and the material interpretation
of this formal condition, i.e., "system." The formal condition of Reason
expresses the systematic nature of Reason as Reason's dimensionality. We
are confronted with this systematic nature at the very moment we arrange
the available data into a system according to a principle. The systematism of
Reason expresses its formal side by the need for a principle of arrangement
and by the arrangement of a coherent view of the data observed. In order to
arrange the experience of the subject-object relation into a coherent system,
the articulation of a grounding Idea (i.e., a concept of Being) is needed.
On the level of the paradigm, we also find the formal condition, i.e.,
"methodological matrix," and a material interpretation of this formal
condition, i.e., "paradigm."
The formal condition of the paradigm needs an understanding of how
knowing functions (epistemology), what can be known (ontology), and
what creates coherence between the two (theology), in order to have a clear
viewpoint for the interpretational endeavor. This formal side or matrix needs
20
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a realization or interpretation out of which methodologies can be developed
for the different subject-object relations.
In analyzing any understanding, whether of a scientific, philosophical, or
naive character, one needs to distinguish the three conditional aspects of
method. 21 The relation between the final and the material aspect is of great
importance. The chosen object of study provides a specific subject matter
that can give a hint about what kind of formal aspect is involved.22 Further,
awareness of the two different levels of the formal aspect, system, and
paradigm, provides orientation in the analysis of scientific results.
The hermeneutical analysis must first uncover the final and material
aspects and then search for the underlying paradigm of the methodology.23
Understanding the epistemological, ontological, and theological perspectives
of the paradigm and their deterministic influence on the data within the
conditions of the final and material inputs, the analysis proceeds by searching
the foundational ontology that undergirds the paradigm.
According to Canale, the various sciences with their various subject
matters need to share the same interpretation of systematism and matrix if
they want to create real unity within structural diversity." This call for
presupposidonal unity is urgent, as the differentiations and specializations
of scientific disciplines increase." The urgency of an interdisciplinary matrix
built upon the same understanding of systematism and matrix intensifies in
the face of growing ideological diversity due to scientific fragmentation. As
the ideological diversity increases, the structural diversity is in danger of
losing its independence and justification. A unified basic ontological
foundation is needed in order not to lose the coherent structural diversity, i.e.,
the interdisciplinary connections between the different scientific enterprises.
3.2.3 Summary
We can see that according to both Dooyeweerd and Canale, any
understanding, but here explicitly scientific and philosophical understanding,
has a hermeneutical nature that hints at the presuppositional levels brought
by the subject or self. No science is able to use philosophy uncritically for
its development of methodologies, since philosophical thinking needs to
involve itself in a transcendental idea (Dooyeweerd) or the interpretation of
the formal conditions of Reason (Canale). Similarly to Canale, Dooyeweerd
21
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can therefore say: "Theology is in need of a radical self-critique as to its
philosophical fundamentals." 26 To both thinkers, the question is not whether
theology should have a philosophical foundation but whether the philosophical
foundation of theology has a biblical or nonbiblical nature.
3.3 Comparison between Dooyeweerd
and Canale
A comparison between Dooyeweerd and Canale on all levels is not possible.
The reason is that Canale has not yet developed a complex philosophy such as
Dooyeweerd's in his New Critique.27
Canale's philosophical work focuses on the phenomenological analysis of
Reason and a biblical interpretation of foundational ontology Aside
from a short outline in his dissertation, Canale has not yet developed an
actual interpretation of Reason's frameworks, especially an ontology and
epistemology, within the setting of a temporal foundational ontology.
Thus the area of comparison is limited and much of Dooyeweerd's
work cannot be included in a comparison. Still, a comparison on the level
of transcendental presuppositions promises to be very fruitful as both
Dooyeweerd and Canale accept transcendental presuppositions as basic and
determinative.
3.3.1 The Necessity of Discovering
Transcendental Presuppositions
Both Dooyeweerd and Canale try to find the most important reasons for the
diversity of philosophical and theological schools within the formal structure
of the philosophical and scientific thought-activity itself. On one hand,
this formal structure reveals the supratemporal character of the necessary
transcendental ideas (Dooyeweerd) and, on the other, the formal structure
reveals the hypotheticity of Reason's hermeneutical presuppositions (Canale).
Both thinkers unite in the claim that an understanding of the inner structure of
humanity's intellectual activity (theoretical thought/Reason) is promising as it
delivers a deeper understanding of the diversity of positions. Insight in this
inner structure, they believe, can lead to mutual understanding and dialogue
between different schools and traditions of thought.28
The discovery of the presuppositional structure of man's intellectual
activity leads both Dooyeweerd and Canale to the conclusion that neither
26
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theoretical thought/Reason nor any other human faculty can be considered
autonomous.
3.3.1.1 Reason and Thinking—Knowledge
Whereas Canale analyzes Reason, Dooyeweerd analyzes theoretical thought.
While Canale understands Reason as all-encompassing, Dooyeweerd
considers theoretical thinking as limited in scope. Canale understands Reason as
basic Knowledge that springs from a subject-object relation, Dooyeweerd
understands theoretical thought as an act that strives for theoretical synthesis to
dissolve the antithetical character of the Gegenstand-relation.
While Canale makes the generation of any knowledge (specific and
general) central to his analysis, Dooyeweerd critically inquires about the
generation of theoretical concepts. As Canale does not offer an elaborate
insight into the difference between scientific and naive thinking, a comparison
with Dooyeweerd's understanding of theoretical thought is difficult.
Nevertheless, an interesting comparison on the understanding of the term
"knowledge" is possible and helpful.
Although Dooyeweerd does not explicitly conceptualize knowledge, N.
G. Geertsema tries to uncover which concept may be assumed on the basis of
Dooyeweerd's thought. 29 On the basis of Geertsema's study, further points of
agreement and disagreement regarding the understanding of knowledge of the
two thinkers can be found.
As explained, Dooyeweerd and Canale do not see the subject-object
relation as problematic. They do not see a fundamental gap between subject
and object or between the human being and the thing to be understood.
Dooyeweerd understands the subject-object and subject-subject relations as
meaningful, i.e., interdependent. Meaning-being implies living in relationship in
a horizontal and vertical sense. In Canale's thought, there is no meaning
outside of a subject-object relationship, since it is only on the basis of a
subject-object relationship that meaning can be generated. To Canale, this fact is
not grounded in an interpretation of the phenomenological structure, but is a
structural necessity of the phenomenological structure itself. In Canale's work,
the contribution of the subject is the interpretational framework that guides
the creation of an image of the object, while the object contributes its lines
of intelligibility. On the basis of his biblical-temporal interpretation of the
phenomenological structure, the gap between the subject and object is
annihilated. The biblical conception of Being does not allow for a dualism between
being and appearance in the classical sense, but implies that being is
appearance and that appearance already implies Knowledge.30 Appearance
29
H. G. Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd on Knowledge and Truth," in Ways of Knowing: In
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implies knowledge because appearance is only appearance at the moment it
is known, i.e., a subject-object relation exists. 31 Thus knowledge does not
need to overcome an ontological gap by means of abstraction. 32 Both the
subject's interpretational framework and the object's lines of intelligibility
have temporal character.
In Dooyeweerd's philosophy, knowledge is closely related to experience.33
Different experiences can be differently qualified. Nevertheless, the analytic
aspect is present in all experience.34 Knowledge does not necessarily need to
be qualified by the analytic aspect in order to be knowledge. Because of this
understanding, Dooyeweerd's concept of knowledge always emphasizes two
aspects. The first aspect is that any thing, entity, event, or human is subject to
the modal laws. Therefore, any act is characterized by all modal aspects. The
other aspect is that all being is meaning-being and does not therefore have
any existence in itself, but is interdependent. In the integral cosmic coherence,
things cannot exist by themselves, but are dependent on other things to realize
their subject- and object-functions.
Connecting knowledge closely to experience, Dooyeweerd rejects the
idea that analytic or logical knowing is the one true way of knowing. The
idea that logical knowing is the only reliable way of knowing is built upon
the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. To Dooyeweerd, analytic
knowing is only one valid way of knowing among many others. He explains
that besides logical knowing, there is also social knowing or instinct, as
knowing that is qualified by the psychic aspect. Every knowing is legitimate
and has its purpose within meaning-being. This does not mean that all subjectobject relations are establishing knowledge. There are also subject-object and
subject-subject relations that have only ontic and not epistemic character. In
his transcendental critique of theoretical thought, however, Dooyeweerd
especially focuses on the analytic way of knowing.
Since any kind of knowing is part of meaning-being, there is no
knowledge that is absolute. All knowledge is relative, and "there is no truth in
itself. 35 Knowledge as the integral experience of meaning-being is therefore
always dependent on the relation of the knowing subject to a known object.
Any object that we "perceive is related to and dependent on our perceptual
apparatus." 36 This again stresses the radical meaning of meaning-being: the
entirety of an object does not exist independently of a subject, and a subject
31
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cannot fully realize itself when it is not related to an object. A further important point to
understand about Dooyeweerd's conception of knowledge is that in the systase (i.e.,
existing in relationship together)37 of the subject-object relation, the object is not a
construction of the mind. Geertsema writes:
There are actual subject-functions of the thing that are objectified in the perceptual
image. Therefore, the objective sensory perceptual image and the subjective image of
my perception are not identical. . . We might even say that there should be a
correspondence between the objective perceptual state of affairs and the subjective
perceptual image (cf. 441). The one is the norm of the other.38

Since subject and object are under the same creational law, the subject- object
relations cannot be consumed by either objectivism or subjectivism, but have a basic
normative character. As the logical object-function of an object is related to the
logical subject-function, it is the responsibility of the subject to disclose the object in a
logical concept that does justice to the logical objective-function of the object as it
corresponds with it.39
While both thinkers agree that meaning is established by the contribution of both
subject and object and that the subject-object relation is considered temporal and thus
nondualisthc, Dooyeweerd's understanding of the subject- object relation and the
distinct contribution of both sides creates a much clearer picture than Canale's. As far
as I can see, Canale cannot be that clear in his explanation, because he has not yet
developed an ontology that helps to explain how the subject-object relation takes place
in the temporal horizon, and he does not introduce the biblical idea of the law to which
all creation is bound. The latter demonstrates the strength of Dooyeweerd's
interpretation of the subject-object relation.
In conclusion, Canale's understanding of Reason has much in common with
Dooyeweerd's understanding of knowledge. While Canale finds Reason to include the
many ways of knowing,4° Dooyeweerd concentrates on an analysis of logically
qualified knowing.
3.3.1 .2 Method
Canale does not choose a distinct religious position in his analysis of the structure
of Reason, but works explicitly from phenomenology. Later we will return to the
question of whether a phenomenological analysis does not in and of itself already
imply a standpoint, rendering it nonneutral.
37
Dooyeweerd's understanding of "systase" is described in Glanz, "Part I: Dooyeweerd
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A practical advantage of a phenomenological analysis could be that it is
likely to be more acceptable and accessible for non-Christian thinkers and
schools of philosophy Canale clearly distinguishes between the formal
structure of Reason and the possible interpretations thereof. This means
that the nonneutrality of human thinking is not defended on the basis of a
Christian interpretation of the phenomenological structure of Reason, but
on the analysis of the phenomenology of Reason itself It does not imply
that Canale does not have any assumptions, but only that his assumptions do
not necessarily have a Christian background and promise to be shared by
different philosophical schools ____ especially by those that take the subjectobject problem as their point of departure. One such broadly acknowledged
assumption is that knowledge is established in the structure of a subjectobject relation. A connected assumption is that no understanding can be
found outside of Reason.
In opposition to Canale, Dooyeweerd chooses an expressly Christian
starting point. This starting point finds its expression in the modal theory that
functions as a basis for especially the second way of his transcendental critique.
Still, the modal theory is not only based on religious beliefs, but is provided
with substantial and persuasive philosophical arguments. Therefore, the theory
should not be unacceptable per se to non-Christian thinkers. Nevertheless,
Dooyeweerd's entire analysis is strongly influenced by the assumption that
God is the only absolute sovereign and that all creation, including all faculties
of humanity, must be understood as relative toward the creator-God. By
means of this religious presupposition, Dooyeweerd can uncover the inner
structure of theoretical thought and reveal that thinking always has religious
presuppositions.
That Dooyeweerd takes a clear ideological position in his structural
analysis can be seen in the fact that in his whole thinking he assumes the temporalsupratemporal-[non-Greek]timelessness framework41 and locates his entire
critique of Western philosophy within this framework. Canale understands
the interpretation of this framework to be the result of an act of faith whose
content does not belong to the phenomenological structure of Reason, but to
the interpretation of the phenomenological structure. Canale's biblical
interpretation of the presuppositional structure of Reason, however, reveals the
temporal-supratemporal distinction as problematic because it is nonbiblical.
Thus Canale's understanding that a concept is basically religious on its
transcendental level builds upon two assumptions: first, Reason is identified
with that which makes knowledge or meaning possible, and knowledge is
identified with that which makes the expression of meaningful words possible;

41
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second, Reason's basic structure is the subject-object relation, since there is no
knowledge outside of this relationship.
One could say that Canale proceeds from a structural abstraction of the
subject-object relationship of knowledge to the presuppositional level of
foundational ontology Dooyeweerd's understanding of the subject matter
builds upon the claim that thinking is not absolute, but dependent on a
relationship with God. Here one could say that Dooyeweerd proceeds from
the content of his religious belief in the Christian God to the presuppositional
level of transcendental ideas.
With this basic distinction in mind, we must clearly distinguish the
Dooyeweerdian and Canalian use of the term "structure." To Dooyeweerd,
the structure of thinking can only be uncovered by the radical biblical
ground-motif of creation-fall-redemption. His structural understanding thus
already includes a religious interpretation and is most likely not achievable
without this religious standpoint. To Canale, the structure of any thoughtact is not uncovered on the basis of an explicit a priori religious standpoint,
but on the basis of a phenomenological analysis. Consequently Canale's
uncovered structure of Reason still needs an interpretation on the basis of a
choice on the level of foundational ontology, while Dooyeweerd's uncovered
structure of thinking is only possible on the basis of a religious choice that
has transcendental character.
3.3.1.3 The Transcendental Presuppositions
Dooyeweerd and Canale use different terms to refer to the transcendental
presuppositions of thinking. Foundational ontology as the underlying structure
of all three frameworks of Reason especially refers to the idea of coherence
mediated by the conception of theos to which foundational ontology is
attributed. In Dooyeweerd's terminology the idea of coherence is coupled
with the ideas of origin and unity to constitute the transcendental ground idea.
Thus, when it comes down to the idea of coherence, foundational ontology
and transcendental ground idea seem to be equivalent. To Canale, however,
the time-supratime-[non-Greek] timelessness framework does not refer to the
idea of origin (which can be found in the theological framework of Reason's
structure), but to the idea of coherence. To Canale, the idea of coherence has
structural priority over the concept of theos/origin. This distinction is important,
since it can be helpful to see a structural distinction between Being and origin,
although a philosophical understanding of foundational ontology implies
necessarily a concept of origin. Thus Canale would consider a transcendental
ground idea that includes origin, unity, and coherence problematic, since it
hides the important phenomenological finding that the framework of the
theos already implies a foundational ontology As I have tried to show before,
foundational ontology conditions the interpretation of the theological
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framework without conditioning the onticity of the origin. Dooyeweerd has a
timeless conception of God because of a specific interpretation of Being.
From a Canalian perspective, Dooyeweerd makes his idea of origin coappear
with a timelessness interpretation of foundational ontology. To Dooyeweerd,
God is beyond created time and created supratemporality, and as creator of
time is himself timeless. Though Dooyeweerd tries to distance himself from
the Greek conception of timelessness, it is questionable whether he really
frees himself from the classical onto-theo-logical paradigm. 42 The fact is
that Dooyeweerd connects his understanding of God with a conception of
timelessness. All of his thinking is attributed to this temporal-supratemporal[nonGreek]timelessness framework. This framework represents the ground of his
argument for coherence and unity. Dooyeweerd's interpretation of
coherence and unity is therefore not simply rooted in the idea of origin as
the one absolute sovereign God (which is a true biblical belief), but also in
the timeless ground of Being that underlies this idea. This latter cannot be
defended by biblical writings.43
Further, the ideas of coherence in Canale's foundational ontology and
Dooyeweerd's transcendental ground idea have different degrees of complexity. The
ideas of unity and coherence in Dooyeweerd's transcendental ground idea are
elaborate. To Canale, the development and elaboration of Dooyeweerd's
transcendental ideas of unity and coherence should be understood as
developed interpretations of a basic foundational ontology. By this, I mean that
the developed Dooyeweerdian concepts of unity and coherence belong to the
interpretation of Canale's framework of ontology rather than to the underlying
structure of foundational ontology. Attributing time to created reality,
supratime to the self, and timelessness to God takes place as interpretation of
the frameworks of Reason within timeless Being as ground.
While the interpretation of God is partly determined by a chosen
ground of Being, the choice for a specific theos is not. In conclusion,
besides the presupposition.al choice for an interpretation of Being, a second
presuppositional choice is required: a specific theos.

42
Oliver Glanz, "Time, Reason, and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical
Assessment, and Further Development of Herman Dooyeweerd's Structural Analysis of
Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of
Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation" (master's thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2006),
nn. 20 and 35.
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The different methods of analyzing theoretical thought/Reason (Christianphilosophical versus phenomenological) can be found back in the different
understandings of "transcendental" and "faith." Based on the slight but
influential difference between the terms "foundational ontology" and
"transcendental ideas," the structural need for a faith-act is differently
interpreted. To Canale, the act of faith by the spontaneous subject is still an
act of Reason. 44 To Dooyeweerd, the act of faith is beyond thinking and of
supratemporal character, taking place in the supratemporal heart.45 I have
explained in the first article why Dooyeweerd places the starting point of
theoretical thought outside of thought. Canale understands faith differently
because of his universalization of Reason. Reason always functions actively
and is present any moment we try to understand or even misunderstand. Since
foundational ontology belongs to the structure of Reason, the structure of
Reason also includes the transcendental primordial presupposition as ground
for any conceptualization of theos, ontos, and the epistemic.
The spontaneity of the subject that chooses for an interpretation of the
ground of Being belongs to the necessary structure of Reason, since it has a
foundational function for the generation of meaning. Faith then belongs to
the structure of Reason, and is therefore an act of Reason.46
These different understandings of the term "faith" give birth to
different characterizations of the term "transcendental" in the thought of
the two thinkers. To Dooyeweerd, "transcendental" refers to that which has
supratemporal function, while Canale understands "transcendental" as the
necessary content of foundational ontology contributed by the act of faith.
This content does not have to be of supratemporal origin or function, but can
also be of temporal character, depending on which foundational ontology is
chosen.
At this point, we can see that Canale would understand Dooyeweerd's
faith-act as a secondary faith-act. This is because Dooyeweerd can only arrive at
his understanding of faith on the basis of a timeless ground of Being,
which is the chosen content of the primary faith-act. Thus Dooyeweerd's
understanding of faith is based on and strongly influenced by his choice of a
distinct foundational ontology (primary faith-act).
As Canale reveals a primordial presuppositional level that goes beyond
the transcendental level of Dooyeweerd, I suggest there are two structurally
distinguished faith-acts that need to take place in order to establish a theoretical
total view on reality. In the first faith-act, content is given to foundational
ontology, while in the second faith-act the choice for a theos (e.g., the biblical
44
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creator-God, survival-of-the-fittest principle, physical-energy principle) is
expressed within the chosen ground of Being.
The awareness of this distinction in faith-acts helps to identify the
foundational ontological structure that underlies the frameworks of theos,
ontos, and logos and helps to criticize the foundational ontological framework
from the perspective of the chosen theos.47
The comparison thus far shows that a division between the
phenomenological structure and the interpretation of the phenomenological
structure helps to discern what content was given to Reason's frameworks in the
course of interpreting them, and to criticize this content from the perspective
of one's own interpretation of Reason's frameworks (as Dooyeweerd does).
3.3.2 Being of God—Created Being
of Humanity
There are several similarities between Canale's interpretation of being and
Dooyeweerd's understanding of meaning-being. To both Dooyeweerd and
Canale, the biblical account does not problematize the relation between God's
being and humanity's being. There is a difference between God's being and
men's being, but not a gap that would make true understanding impossible.
Therefore, neither dualism nor tension can be found in God's creation and its
relative relation to him.
The fact that the difference between the source of being (God) and being
(meaning-being) is not situated in dualism is in need of explanation. Such an
explanation is not only of religious interest, but also of philosophical interest as
the diversity of reality needs a coherent explanation rooted in the idea of origin.
Such an explanation can be found in the terminology of the two thinkers.
Canale speaks of the relation between the rational ground of Being and being
as structural relation discovered through phenomenological analysis. The
interpretation of God's being and creational being, i.e., theology and ontology,
can be understood as "regional" interpretations placed within universal Reason.
Being is, however, revealed by God (in Scripture), which makes a rational
understanding of God's being (theology) possible. Dooyeweerd speaks of
the relation between being and meaning-being ("zin-zijn"). Both thinkers try to
point to the continuity-discontinuity relation between God and creation
through their terminology. Their different interpretations of the transcendence
of God constitute the core motif of their explanations of the fundamental
relation between God and humanity.
In order to understand better the two approaches to this relation, I will
summarize the classical Thomistic explanation of this relation (4.2.1) and the
Dooyeweerdian and Canalian critique thereof (4.2.2).
47
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3.3.2.1 Analogia entis
Dooyeweerd and Canale basically agree on the following description and
analysis of the analogia entis:48
To Thomas, the perfection of God finds its expression in his creation.
This means that we can only grasp the eternal timeless perfection of God
through the diversity of reality. The temporal diversity of reality as a whole
reflects and expresses the perfection of God. On the side of time, there is
diversity, and on the side of God's divine timelessness, there is perfection.
In a certain sense, the diversity points to the divine perfection within time.
There are different levels of diversity that express the perfection of God in
different degrees. Human beings express the being of God more exactly than
any other creatures. These varying degrees of expression are crucial for
understanding the Thomistic analogia entis. The diversity of being is located in
the dualistic tension between being and nonbeing. The diversity of being is
correlated to the diversity in intensity of taking part in the divine being. Every
level of being thus expresses the perfection of God, but can be hierarchically
organized in terms of exactness. Lower levels of being are more distant from
the perfection of God and head toward nothingness.
The tension between God and nothingness forms the background of
the classic understanding of the position of reason: the immortal soul as
the substantial form of the body is understood as anima rationalis. 49 The
anima rationalis is the closest to God and itself of timeless character. By this
interpretation, reason received an absolutistic interpretation and position
within the human scope of being. Reason is the central expression of
humanity as imago dei. The absolutization of reason in classical thought and
its accompanying dualism causes various ontological and epistemological
problems.
3.3.2.2 Ways of Overcoming
Contrary to Thomas, both Dooyeweerd and Canale try to ground their
philosophical understanding of the relation between God and humanity in
Scripture (and more specifically in Exod 6). 50 Dooyeweerd and Canale also
agree that a true, i.e., biblical understanding of meaning-being/being, can only
48
Cf. H. G. Geertsema, "Transcendentale Opeilheid: Over Het Zinkarakter Van de
Werkelijkheid in De Wijsbegeerte Van H. Dooyeweerd," Philosophia reformata: organ van de
Vereiging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 35 (1970): 25-32; Canale, A Criticism of Theological
Reason, 164-208.
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Hans Joachim Storig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003), 288-289.
50
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285-289, 364-366.
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be derived from an understanding of God, as he is the origin of meaning
being/being.
Although both choose the biblical God as the radical origin of all creation, they clearly
differ in the characterization of God's being. Canale views Being as radically connected
with YHWH's being in Exod 6.51 He characterizes the being of God as temporal since
in Exod 6, YHWH explains his own being within a temporal ground of Being. With
this background, Canale arrives at his foundational ontological interpretation of Reason's
dimensionality that is contrary to Dooyeweerd.52
According to Canale, the Bible knows the being of God through the temporal
extensions of past, present, and future. In Canale's exegetical discovery, YHWH is
both the subject that causes the action and the object on which the action is
accomplished.53 Therefore, the appearance of God as object of his action is his
being itself:54 God's being and appearance are one and therefore express the
covenant-trustworthiness of a personal God. There is no analogical gap between
appearance and being as both are grounded in the same temporal ontological
foundation.55 In order to prevent misunderstanding, Canale stresses that the beingappearance identification is presenting itself as a dynamic one within the biblical text.
God himself is in the fire, but he is not fire. To understand this fact, new
epistemological categories need to be developed, since all the categories we use and
know are placed within and understood from a timeless framework.56
According to Canale's interpretation of the phenomenological structure of
Reason, the epistemological framework needs to be understood within temporality.
This idea seems to harmonize with Dooyeweerd's conclusion that thinking is of
nonsupratemporal character, bound to the horizon of time. Still, Canale characterizes
the temporal-cognitive process differently as he disconnects it from a supratemporal
heart. To Canale, the human soul/heart is as temporal as the self's thinking. In order to
discover the meaning of the temporally extended subject matter, cognition must go
through a "tension" (gathering) process. The classical idea of the analogia entis is
overcome, as there is nothing behind the phenomenon: the phenomenon is everything,
Only the coappearance of Being enables God, man, and other entities to appear. The
denial of the analogia entis idea does not refuse an analogical procedure, but calls for a
redefinition. The choice for a temporal dimensionality of Reason will lead to the
concept that the analogical procedure does not require a
51
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discontinuity with the intelligibility of what is given in the temporal realm of
appearances, but does require the continuity of the meaning and intelligibility of
what is given in the temporal realm of appearances with what is beyond the
moment of presence, i.e., the temporal extension of being (past and future
appearances). Consequently, the continuity between the relation of God and
creation is found within time.
According to Dooyeweerd, the term "being" does not exist in the
Thomistic way of understanding. To Dooyeweerd, the term "being" only
exists as Being, i.e., only as God's Being. All creation exists as meaning, not as
being. This idea is connected to the biblical idea that Being57 is only expressed
in relation to YHWH and his revelation of the meaning of his name. Being is
therefore understood as "zelfgenoegzaamheid" (self-satisfaction). Meaning is
understood as relative and "onzelfgenoegzame" (not self-satisfied) meaningbeing.58 Thus Dooyeweerd does not create a single terminology to describe the
existence of God and the reality of creation. He does not locate the cause of
meaning-being in the being of God as such, but in his will. Thus Dooyeweerd
seems to try to place the problem of continuity and discontinuity in a realm
other than the ontological, since the will of God cannot be identified with the
Being of God.59
This strategy suggests that the analogia entis no longer needs to bridge
an ontological discontinuity. Nevertheless, the problem is not solved while
the answer to the question of how we can come to an understanding of
God remains completely mysterious. First, one might ask whether knowledge
of God's will is itself not already knowledge about God's being. Second,
there is the question of how an understanding of God is possible, if there is
no basic naive conception of God's onticity. Such a naive understanding of
God is crucial if Christian theoretical thought is to be possible. This
question seems to lead Dooyeweerd back to a basic temporal ontological
discontinuity between creator and creation in the end. This discontinuity finds
expression in the importance of the time-supratimejnon-Greek]timelessness
framework that functions as the presupposition of his modal theory in his
New Critique.60 Still, this ontological discontinuity between God and man is
not bridged by analogy, as Dooyeweerd argues for the radical dependence of all
creation on God. Dooyeweerd solves the problem by placing the center of humanity
in the heart and not in an anima rationalis.61 Biblical understanding
57
"Being" in this context should not be confused with Canale's use of the term. To Canale,
"Being" is not equivalent to "existence." Cf. Glanz, "Part 2: Canale on Reason," §1.2.3.
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places the heart beyond any anima rationalis. 62 Making the anima
rationalis the center of humanity stems from an absolutization of rational
capacity, which contradicts the biblical conception of relative and radically
dependent creation, contradicts the biblical teaching of the all-encompassing
fallenness of humanity, including the heart, and ignores-the heart that is the
center of human individuality and identity
Since Dooyeweerd identifies the heart with supratemporality and
supramodality, he is able to prevent reductionistic tendencies when it shares in
the biblical starting point of the only sovereign and independent God. By
identifying the heart with supratemporality, Dooyeweerd needs to reinterpret
the analogical idea as having temporal instead of supratemporal character.
To Dooyeweerd, analogies were mistakenly used in classical thought to
bridge the time-timelessness gap. In contrast, Dooyeweerd uses analogy to
create inner coherence between the temporal diversity of modalities. These
analogical moments do not bridge the gap between time and timelessness,
but between the different modalities within time. Thomas, in contrast, uses
analogy to relate the continuity and discontinuity between creation and
creator.
We have seen that the critique of Dooyeweerd and Canale on the
analogical understanding of Thomas does not destroy, but redefines analogical
terminology. In the redefinition of analogical moments, Dooyeweerd and
Canale, however, lose their conformity Dooyeweerd's critique targets
the Thomistic misinterpretation of cosmic time, which is most centrally
expressed in his idea that the human heart is the root-unity 6 3 of created
reality The two aspects, cosmic time and the heart as supratemporal rootunity, are the central focus of his critique. Canale focuses his critique of the
analogical understanding much more on the time-timelessness framework
that created the ontological gap between God and creation in the first place. If
a biblical philosophy is to be developed, a reinterpretation of the relation
between time and timelessness is not needed, but rather a reinterpretation
of foundational ontology. Thus, while Dooyeweerd accepts the timeless
interpretation of foundational ontology but reinterprets and modifies it in
regard to the relation between creator and creation, Canale sees the need for a
fully new foundational ontology that does justice to the biblical conception of
God and thereby eliminates the specific ontological gap.
Both Dooyeweerd and Canale understand the classical epistemological
problem as being ontological in nature. They, however, solve this ontological
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problem in different ways. Further, both argue that the concentration point
and coherence of the ontic diversity is found in the thinking subject.
3.3.3 Understanding of the
Subject-Object Relation
Dooyeweerd and Canale agree that the classical idea of correspondence
between knowing and being is problematic, since its underlying metaphysical
conception assumes a gap between subject and object. 64 The two thinkers
locate the classical motives to problematize the subject-object relation, i.e., to
recognize an ontological gap between subject and object, in presuppositions
that were adopted by classical thinkers (cf. 1.3.1.1). Canale locates it in
the classical timeless ground of Being, while Dooyeweerd locates it in the
different unbiblical ground-motives that are characterized by the dogma of
the autonomy of theoretical thought. The autonomy of theoretical thought
leads to absolutizations of different possible Gegenstand-relations and
misinterpretations of the modal kernel of the Gegenstand and its analogical
relations as representing the content of transcendental ideas. Because of this
the Gegenstand-relation has been mistaken for the subject-object relation in
the history of philosophy. This led to the lack of awareness that theoretical
thinking—being crucially different from naive thinking—has a necessarily
religious starting point.
Because Dooyeweerd and Canale see that meaning-being/being always
encompasses theoretical knowing/knowing, the theory of correspondence
between knowing and being in its classical metaphysical sense is not acceptable.
They come to similar conclusions by different arguments. Dooyeweerd grounds
his argumentation in his ontology Based on his modal theory, Dooyeweerd
knows that theoretical and pretheoretical thought are always characterized
by cosmic time. The analytic aspect does not have a supraposition in regard
to the diversity of modalities, but is itself a part thereof. Analytic thinking
is therefore one aspect of meaning-being and thus cannot correspond with
being. Further, the conception of reality that undergirds the correspondence
theory is contrary to Dooyeweerd's philosophy. As explained, in our naive
state of being, we experience the subject-object or subject-subject relations
integrally intertwined. Things do exist in relationship (systasis). Things cannot
exist by themselves: this would contradict the central character of meaning64
Canale puts emp h asis on th e fact th at f ro m a ration al perspectiv e th e
adherents of the correspondence theory have overcome most of the epistemological
problems and provide coherent explanations. Therefore, Canale does not consider
the correspondence theory as necessarily problematic from a rational perspective,
but from the perspective of biblical ontological and dimensionality. To him, it is not
necessary to challenge the coherence of viability of classical or modern philosophy,
but to point out that they have difficulties to integrate the phenomena and claims of
Scripture. See Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 127.
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being. Creation as meaning-being is defined as expressing radical dependence on its
creator as relative being, and expressing inner interdependence and therefore
uniformity in being subject to the same law.65 Canale arrives at the conclusion that
Being encompasses knowing without depending on an ontology. To him, the
interrelation between Being and knowing is a structural necessity uncovered by the
phenomenological analysis.
In contrast to Dooyeweerd, Canale shows that metaphysical
abstractions like "form and matter," "grace and nature," or "freedom and nature" are
necessarily determined by the presuppositional acceptance of a timeless
dimensionality of Reason. Flowing from timeless Being, the time- timeless dualism as
a basic framework of Reason has often functioned as an interpretative tool of
philosophical thinking. Identifying the two poles has led to different absolutizations.
The timeless conception has often been identified with reason and the
existentiality of emotions. In the case of such identification, an idea of reality in
itself was considered attainable by rational or emotional abstraction. In the absence
of such identification, knowledge or reality in itself was considered unattainable.
This conclusion was only possible because of the distinction between reality in itself
and reality as it appears, which is based on the timeless dimensionality of
Reason. Consequently, in Canak's critique there are two levels that account for the
dualism within the subject-object relation: the chosen dimensionality of Reason that
opens the structural possibility for dualistic interpretations, and the content of the
different dualistic interpretations, varying in terms of which human faculty (if any at
all) is identified with the realm of timelessness. To Canale, a biblical-temporal
interpretation of the ground of Being negates the idea of a metaphysical thing in
itself.
Dooyeweerd shares Canale's second level. In fact, as Dooyeweerd is not laying
bare the foundational ontological level, but concentrates much more on the different
interpretations of the time-timeless framework, he offers a more detailed
understanding of the necessary interpretational act in which a supratemporal
standpoint is sought. He argues that any abstraction that identifies something modal
with supratemporality has its roots in the logical Gegenstand-relation that assumes
thought itself to be supratemporal and therefore interprets the logical analogies
within the modal diversity as the essence of reality. Since he connects the dichotomy
of "reality in itself" and "reality as it appears" to the absolutization of something
temporal, thereby rendering it supratemporal, he locates the problem much more in
this idealization than in the time-timeless framework. The question here is whether a
new identification with the supratemporal realm, as Dooyeweerd proposes in the form
of the human heart, will really solve the dualistic problem of the subject-object
relation. If it is possible to solve the subject65
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object dualism within a timeless ground of Being, a temporal dimensionality of
Reason as a solution to the classical and modern subject-object problem
would not be needed. Canale's argument that the time-timeless dichotomy is
the cause of dualism would consequently be tremendously weakened. But to
demonstrate that the subject-object problem is solved, Dooyeweerdian
thinking would need to prove that the reidentification of the supratemporal
with the human heart makes all dualism disappear. 66 Not only the classical
chorismos between subject and object would need to be overcome, but also
the chorismos between man and God that prevents a true understanding of
temporal reality as it appears. I personally think that the latter problem will
hardly be solvable if Dooyeweerdian thinking will hold on to its belief that
thought and experience are temporal, the heart supratemporal, and God
timeless. 67 But even if theoretically a dualism in Dooyeweerd's philosophy
could be overcome, it does not necessarily mean that it proves to be biblical. In
any case, Canale would stress that a truly biblical philosophy needs to work
on the basis of a temporal dimensionality of Reason and establish a theory
that does not overcome dualism within a time-timeless setting, but within a
biblical-temporal setting. Christian philosophy does not accomplish its task
when it reinterprets the widely accepted timeless interpretation of Being,
but needs to be more fundamentally critical by investigating whether timeless
Being is representing biblical foundational ontology at all. Canale can agree with
Dooyeweerd's
understanding
of
the
erroneous
absolutization
or
supratemporalization of the temporal, but he reaches beyond by challenging
the very assumption that there is both a temporal and supratemporal world.
After having shown that Dooyeweerd and Canale argue against the
autonomy of rational thinking, it can easily be pointed out that because
they view Reason/theoretical thinking as being encompassed by being/
Being, they agree that there is no absolute world and therefore no absolute
knowledge.68 Accordingly, both thinkers reject the idea of truth as agreement
between thought and being. This rejection is based on the fact that such a
definition implies a "thing in itself" that is timeless and requires a cognitive
faculty that is able to participate in the supratemporal world in order to be
66
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known. If absoluteness is therefore understood as timeless and immutable,
both Dooyeweerd and Canale see the need to reject the idea of absolute
knowledge.
3.3.4 Application of Analysis
The application of the analysis of Dooyeweerd and Canale shows that
they agree that philosophy has an important role in setting the stage for
any scientific discipline. Philosophy is concerned with the interpretation of
systematism and matrix (Canale) or the theoretical construction of reality in
its totality (Dooyeweerd). Since any scientific discipline shares a system/total
view on reality that largely determines the outcome of understanding, the
discipline that addresses this level is most essential.
Dooyeweerd's analysis of theoretical thinking is much more persuasive in
its application than Canale's. The three transcendental ideas prove to be
helpful hermeneutical tools to uncover the presuppositional level of scientific
theories and philosophies.
Further, with help of the modal theory, the individual sovereignty of
different scientific disciplines can more easily be justified. To Canale, such
justification, on the basis of his understanding of "method" is rather
difficult, even though he emphasizes that a structural variety of methods is
needed to do justice to the diversity of objects and subject matters. This
difficulty exists because his formal structure of Reason does not allow for a
classification of the many possible subject matters. Such a classification
would demand an ontology. An ontology is necessary to differentiate between
naive and theoretical thinking in terms of the subject-object relationship
and Gegenstand-relation. The development thereof would help to distinguish
different classifications of subject matters and objects. The current state of
development of Canale's structure of Reason finds its best application in the
discipline of Christian theology, where it is often the different groundings
of the concept of God that generate different theological understandings.
However, I believe that Canale's application of the structure of Reason can
also be a great analytical tool in the realm of the humanities. Canale's analysis
cannot yet be of much value to the natural sciences, as it does not yet include a
developed ontology.
In the Christian perspective of both Dooyeweerd and Canale, it is God
who provides through revelation the starting point of philosophy. Humanity
in its spontaneity (Canale) or freedom (Dooyeweerd) is not determined
to choose this specific starting point, but is determined to make a specific
choice that functions as the starting point. The consequences of rejecting the
Christian starting point are characterized differently by the two thinkers. In
Dooyeweerd's modal theory, any nonbiblical starting point will raise antinomies. In
contrast, Canale does see the possibility that many different interpretations
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of Reason are all coherent. I think this contrast stems from Canale's neglect in
distinguishing between meaning and the rational expression of Meaning. I
agree with Canale that there are many different or even opposing expressions of
Meaning possible that are coherent. However, not all expressions of
Meaning equally correspond to the experience of Meaning. I will come back to
this point in my critique in the forthcoming fourth article.
3.4 Summary
O n t h e ba s i s o f D o oy e we e r d' s a n d C a n a l e ' s d i f f e r e n t a na ly se s of
presuppositions and a comparison of their thinking, we can see that Canale's
analysis and biblical interpretation of the phenomenological structure
provides a perspective to criticize Dooyeweerd's presuppositions. On the
other hand, Dooyeweerd's modal theory is helpful for critically examining
Canale's understanding of Meaning. In addition, the value of Dooyeweerd in
contributing to a further development of the interpretation of Canale's
frameworks of Reason lies in his inspiring modal theory, the clear distinction
between theoretical and naïve thinking, and the central role given to the
heart.
The fourth and last article will be dedicated to an integration of both
thinkers into a meaningful system after a critique has revealed the weak or
incomplete aspects of Dooyeweerd's and Canale's analysis and application
thereof.

